STACKELBERG SOLVABLE GAMES AND PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATION

被引：30

作者：

DASPREMONT, C ^{[1
]}

GERARDVARET, LA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CATHOLIC UNIV LOUVAIN,CTR OPERAT RES ECONOMETR,B-1348 LOUVAIN LA NEUVE,BELGIUM

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(80)90006-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：201 / 217

页数：17

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