RELATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE COURTS - AN ANALYSIS OF INCOMPLETE AGREEMENTS AND JUDICIAL STRATEGIES

被引:137
作者
SCHWARTZ, A [1 ]
机构
[1] YALE UNIV, SCH ORG & MANAGEMENT, NEW HAVEN, CT 06520 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/467908
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
引用
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页码:271 / 318
页数:48
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