SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING IN A MARKET WITH ONE SELLER AND 2 DIFFERENT BUYERS

被引：10

作者：

HENDON, E

TRANAES, T

机构：

[1] Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1991年 / 3卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. © 1991.

引用

页码：453 / 466

页数：14

共 8 条

[1] LIMIT-THEOREMS FOR MARKETS WITH SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING [J].