FICTITIOUS PLAY, SHAPLEY POLYGONS, AND THE REPLICATOR EQUATION

被引:72
作者
GAUNERSDORFER, A [1 ]
HOFBAUER, J [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV VIENNA,INST MATH,A-1090 VIENNA,AUSTRIA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1995.1052
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 [经济学];
摘要
For many normal form games, the limiting behavior of fictitious play and the time-averaged replicator dynamics coincide. In particular, we show this for three examples, where this limit is not a Nash equilibrium, but a Shapley polygon. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:279 / 303
页数:25
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