FICTITIOUS PLAY, SHAPLEY POLYGONS, AND THE REPLICATOR EQUATION

被引：72

作者：

GAUNERSDORFER, A ^{[1
]}

HOFBAUER, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV VIENNA,INST MATH,A-1090 VIENNA,AUSTRIA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1995年 / 11卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1995.1052

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

For many normal form games, the limiting behavior of fictitious play and the time-averaged replicator dynamics coincide. In particular, we show this for three examples, where this limit is not a Nash equilibrium, but a Shapley polygon. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：279 / 303

页数：25

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[2]

EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIA RESISTANT TO MUTATION [J].