GAME-THEORETIC MODELS AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN BARGAINING

Examines the behavioral implications and empirical testability of the game-theoretic models of bargaining that follow in the tradition begun by J. F. Nash (1950, 1953). The classical game-theoretic models are reviewed with particular attention to the assumptions they make concerning the kinds of information shared by the bargainers. The experimental literature concerned with testing these models is also reviewed, with attention to the extent to which these experiments have conformed to the assumptions of the models they are designed to test. Some of the principal differences between the theoretical predictions and the results reported in the experiments seem to be due to questions concerning the information shared by the bargainers. A new game-theoretic model is presented, based on assumptions about information that more closely correspond to the conditions under which many of the experiments have been conducted. An experiment involving a bargaining game with undergraduate Ss manipulated the appropriate kind of information and supported the hypothesis that Nash's bargaining model has predictive value in situations that conform to its assumptions about information, but results also suggest that only a relatively narrow range of situations may conform completely to these assumptions. (47 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved). © 1979 American Psychological Association.