RATIONALIZING PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS

被引:6
作者
BRENNAN, G [1 ]
HAMLIN, A [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV SOUTHAMPTON,SOUTHAMPTON SO9 5NH,HANTS,ENGLAND
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
D O I
10.1080/00323269308402253
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Public Choice analysis of democratic political institutions focuses on the issues that are most salient under US constitutional arrangements. Parliamentary systems offer different institutional arrangements and different challenges to the Public Choice approach. We outline a Public Choice account of parliamentary democracy which concentrates attention on the roles of electoral competition and disciplined political parties, while also offering a discussion of parliamentary procedure. The Public Choice approach is contrasted with the mainstream view of representative, responsible government in which disciplined political parties are often seen as a threat to parliamentary democracy.
引用
收藏
页码:443 / 457
页数:15
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