RATIO EQUILIBRIA AND CORE OF VOTING GAME G(N,W) IN A PUBLIC-GOODS ECONOMY

被引:27
作者
KANEKO, M [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV TSUKUBA,TSUKUBA,JAPAN
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1913951
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
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页码:1589 / 1594
页数:6
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