ON THE DEFINITION OF THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA

被引:68
作者
HILLAS, J
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10.2307/2938320
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F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:1365 / 1390
页数:26
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