TESTING IN MODELS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

被引：25

作者：

NALEBUFF, B

SCHARFSTEIN, D

机构：

[1] PRINCETON UNIV, PRINCETON, NJ 08544 USA

[2] HARVARD UNIV, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1987年 / 54卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297516

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：265 / 277

页数：13

共 19 条

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