DISTORTION OF PREFERENCES AND THE NASH THEORY OF BARGAINING

被引：33

作者：

CRAWFORD, VP ^{[1
]}

VARIAN, HR ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MICHIGAN,ANN ARBOR,MI 48109

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1979年 / 3卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(79)90118-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

It is shown that in Nash bargaining over division of a single good, when agents are allowed to distort their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions into any (weakly) concave form, reporting linear utility functions constitutes a unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium. © 1979.

引用

页码：203 / 206

页数：4

共 10 条

[1] POWER AND TAXES IN A MULTI-COMMODITY ECONOMY [J].