NEW PRODUCT INTRODUCTION UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY IN COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES

被引：21

作者：

CHATTERJEE, R ^{[1
]}

SUGITA, Y ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV TOKYO,TOKYO 113,JAPAN

来源：

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 1990年 / 11卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1002/mde.4090110102

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A game‐theoretic model is employed to examine the conditions under which firms in a duopoly, faced with a new product introduction opportunity of uncertain profitability (because of uncertainty in demand), choose to enter the market immediately or, alternatively, decide to wait, thereby avoiding the risk of failure. The implications for a firm's strategic behavior are contrasted with situations in which the competitor is believed to be (1) passive, implying that the firm expects to enjoy indefinite monopoly status if it introduces the new product, and (2) committed to a waiting strategy, implying monopoly status for a limited time period, if the new product is successful. Copyright © 1990 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

引用

页码：1 / 12

页数：12

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