ON NEGOTIATED QUOTAS, TARIFFS, AND TRANSFERS

被引：1

作者：

COPELAND, B

TOWER, E

WEBB, M

机构：

[1] DUKE UNIV,DURHAM,NC 27706

[2] UNIV KENTUCKY,LEXINGTON,KY 40506

来源：

OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 1989年 / 41卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041927

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：774 / 788

页数：15

共 17 条

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