BILATERAL MONOPOLIES AND INCENTIVES FOR MERGER

被引：347

作者：

HORN, H

WOLINSKY, A

机构：

[1] UNIV STOCKHOLM,INST INT ECON STUDIES,S-10691 STOCKHOLM,SWEDEN

[2] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,CHICAGO,IL 60611

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1988年 / 19卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555664

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：408 / 419

页数：12

共 9 条

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