TAXES AND BRIBERY - THE ROLE OF WAGE INCENTIVES

被引：205

作者：

BESLEY, T ^{[1
]}

MCLAREN, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] COLUMBIA UNIV,NEW YORK,NY 10027

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 1993年 / 103卷 / 416期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2234340

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：119 / 141

页数：23

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