In recent years, there has been a growing concern about the recourse to antidumping measures by the GATT member countries. Such measures can become a substitute for selective protection. In the present article, the dumping and injury determinations of the E.C. are subjected to econometric analysis, using the Finger-Hall-Nelson (FHN) model which makes a distinction between the political determinants and the technical determinants. The results show that the technical variables dominate the dumping decisions while the political variables are more important in the injury determinations of the E.C. A comparison with the results obtained by the FHN study confirm the broad similarity between the E.C. and the U.S. patterns, although the E.C. injury decisions are somewhat more susceptible to the influence of political variables. The results of the study suggest that those who are interested in restraining the misuse of the antidumping provisions should concentrate their attention on the injury determination mechanism.
