BARGAINING RULES OF THUMB

被引：8

作者：

ROSENTHAL, RW

机构：

[1] Boston University, Boston

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1993年 / 22卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-2681(93)90070-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A steady-state, random-matching game model is used to described bargaining in a large Population, where bargainers choose rules of thumb to apply across the board in a class of bargaining situations they face. The unique population equilibrium rule distributions are computed for certain cases of the model. These are then used in an exercise to analyze the relationship between a society's wealth and the relative frequency of haggled transactions in the society.

引用

页码：15 / 24

页数：10

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