NARCO-TRAFFIC AND GUERRILLA WARFARE - A NEW SYMBIOSIS

被引:12
作者
BRITO, DL
INTRILIGATOR, MD
机构
[1] RICE UNIV,DEPT ECON,HOUSTON,TX 77251
[2] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT ECON,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
来源
DEFENCE ECONOMICS | 1992年 / 3卷 / 04期
关键词
GUERRILLA WARFARE; OPTIMAL CONTROL; DRUG LORDS; NARCO-TRAFFIC;
D O I
10.1080/10430719208404736
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper considers the role of drug lords in narco-trafficking. The model is of a three-person game with a two-stage structure. The first stage is the war between the guerrillas and the government, while the second stage is the relationship between the participants in the guerrilla war and the drug lords, where the drug lords act as Stackelberg leaders with the government and the guerrillas acting as Stackelberg followers. The dynamics of the model imply that the drug lords can achieve their own preferred outcome by appropriate transfers to one side or the other in the guerrilla war.
引用
收藏
页码:263 / 274
页数:12
相关论文
共 14 条
[1]  
BRITO D, 1989, INT INTERACT, V15, P319
[2]  
CHAPELLE D, 1960, MODERN GUERRILLA WAR, P325
[3]  
Fudenberg D., 1991, GAME THEORY
[4]  
Guevara E., 1985, GUERRILLA WARFARE
[5]  
Intriligator M. D., 1971, MATH OPTIMIZATION EC
[6]   A PREDATOR-PREY MODEL OF GUERRILLA WARFARE [J].
INTRILIGATOR, MD ;
BRITO, DL .
SYNTHESE, 1988, 76 (02) :235-244
[7]  
Lawrence T. E., 1936, 7 PILLARS WISDOM
[8]  
MAO ZD, 1949, PROTRACTED WAR
[9]  
Mao Zedong, 1978, GUERRILLA WARFARE
[10]   EXPLORATION IN THEORY OF OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION [J].
MIRRLEES, JA .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1971, 38 (114) :175-208