LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF INFORMATION-REVEALING INCENTIVE SCHEMES IN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

被引：7

作者：

MILLER, J ^{[1
]}

MURRELL, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MARYLAND,DEPT ECON,COLLEGE PK,MD 20742

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0147-5967(81)90046-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：251 / 271

页数：21

共 28 条

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[7] INCENTIVES IN TEAMS
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[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 20 (02) : 231 - 259
[9] Hayek FA, 1945, AM ECON REV, V35, P519
[10] HILDEBRANDT GG, 1979, J COMP EC, V3, P217