COMMUNITY CHOICE OF REVENUE INSTRUMENTS

被引：22

作者：

HENDERSON, JV

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence

来源：

REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 24卷 / 02期

关键词：

PROPERTY TAXATIONS; TIEBOUT MODEL; LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS; JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION;

D O I：

10.1016/0166-0462(93)02036-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper analyzes communities' choices of revenue instruments, such as property taxes, land taxes, housing revenues, fees, and head taxes, in an imperfect competition framework. Developer-dominated, or profit-maximizing communities generally prefer fees or charges to taxes; while voter-dominated, or utility-maximizing communities prefer taxes to fees. The impact of balanced budget constraints, restrictions on the choices of instruments, and public service choices are also analyzed.

引用

页码：159 / 183

页数：25

共 35 条

[1] ELEMENTARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THEORY OF EXPENDITURES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS [J].