Insurance and catastrophes

被引:12
作者
Zeckhauser, R
机构
[1] Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, 02138, MA
来源
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE THEORY | 1995年 / 20卷 / 02期
关键词
catastrophe; insurance; moral hazard; copayment; experience rating; distribution distortion;
D O I
10.1007/BF01258392
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Catastrophes provide a principal justification for insurance. Traditional conceptions of catastrophes miss three critical elements. (1) Marry catastrophes-the liability revolution in the United States, for example-are not bolts from the blue. Rather, they develop over many years and result from human activity. (2) Conventional, experienced-based models for assessing losses often smudge the distinction, so critical for catastrophes, between probability and magnitude of loss. (3) Normal insurance contracts, with heavy copayments for small losses but little charge at the margin for large ones, perform poorly when the insured can tradeoff probability and size of loss-a phenomenon we label distribution distortion. Tire structures of optimal insurance contracts are assessed.
引用
收藏
页码:157 / 175
页数:19
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