THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：1140

作者：

FUDENBERG, D ^{[1
]}

MASKIN, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1911307

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：533 / 554

页数：22

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