THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF TAKEOVERS

被引：163

作者：

SCHARFSTEIN, D

机构：

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1988年 / 55卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297576

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：185 / 199

页数：15

共 15 条

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