MANAGERS TRADING AROUND STOCK REPURCHASES

被引：89

作者：

LEE, DS ^{[1
]}

MIKKELSON, WH ^{[1
]}

PARTCH, MM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV OREGON, EUGENE, OR 97403 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 1992年 / 47卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2329003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We analyze personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tender offer. With the exception of Dutch auction offers, managers trade their firm's shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside information to outsiders. Prior to fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover-related events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of their firm's shares. Prior to repurchases that follow takeover-related events, only a decrease in selling is found. No abnormal trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers.

引用

页码：1947 / 1961

页数：15

共 21 条

[1] DUTCH AUCTION REPURCHASES - AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER HETEROGENEITY [J].