CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE - A POLITICAL-ECONOMY APPROACH

被引：15

作者：

BOWLES, P ^{[1
]}

WHITE, G ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV SUSSEX,INST DEV STUDIES,BRIGHTON BN1 9RH,E SUSSEX,ENGLAND

来源：

JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES | 1994年 / 31卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1080/00220389408422359

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

The article uses a political economy approach to examine critically the conventional arguments for central bank independence and to make the terms of debate more precise. It assesses the advisability and feasibility of greater autonomy in relation to the constellations of political forces in specific societies and concludes by suggesting how, in the context of developing societies, an accommodation of interests might be reached to support a more autonomous but not fully independent central bank.

引用

页码：235 / 264

页数：30