DISCRIMINATION AND OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT IN A SEGMENTED LABOR-MARKET

被引：8

作者：

GOTTFRIES, N ^{[1
]}

MCCORMICK, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV SOUTHAMPTON, SOUTHAMPTON SO9 5NH, HANTS, ENGLAND

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1995年 / 39卷 / 01期

关键词：

DISCRIMINATION; SEGMENTED; DUAL; SCREENING; UNEMPLOYMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/0014-2921(94)00012-O

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Jobs in the primary sector require firm-specific training, with wages determined as a result of bargaining. Firms pay for the training and since they are imperfectly informed about worker productivity, they test workers before hiring them. The secondary sector is competitive. Taking a job in the secondary sector signals low productivity, and therefore workers in the secondary sector are unable to get jobs in the primary sector. Open unemployment coexists with unfilled vacancies for low wage jobs.

引用

页码：1 / 15

页数：15

共 18 条

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