WHY PROBABILISTIC SUPPORT IS NOT INDUCTIVE

被引：42

作者：

POPPER, K ^{[1
]}

MILLER, DW ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV WARWICK, DEPT PHILOSOPHY, COVENTRY CV4 7AL, W MIDLANDS, ENGLAND

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY A-MATHEMATICAL PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES | 1987年 / 321卷 / 1562期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1098/rsta.1987.0033

中图分类号：

O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：569 / 591

页数：23

共 46 条

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[2]

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[3]

De Finetti B, 1974, THEORY PROBABILITY, V1, DOI 10.1002/9781119286387

[4] DUALLING - A CRITIQUE OF AN ARGUMENT OF POPPER AND MILLER [J].

DUNN, JM ;

HELLMAN, G .

[5]

GAIFMAN H, 1985, ERKENNTNIS, V22, P5

[6] IN DEFENSE OF THE POPPER-MILLER ARGUMENT [J].

GILLIES, D .

[7]

Good I.J., 1985, BAYESIAN STAT, V2, P249

[8] PROBABILISTIC INDUCTION IS INEVITABLE [J].

GOOD, IJ .

GOOD, IJ .

[10] THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF INDUCTIVE PROBABILITY [J].

GOOD, IJ .