THE REPRESENTATIONAL FRAMEWORK IN PERCEPTUAL THEORY

被引：12

作者：

EPSTEIN, W

机构：

[1] University of Wisconsin, Madison, 53706, WI, W. J. Brogden Psychology Bldg.

来源：

PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS | 1993年 / 53卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.3758/BF03211747

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

The representational stance in perceptual theory is described and its proper domain of application is examined. A decision rule for invoking representation is proposed but, although the rule is principled, its implementation is problematic. Despite the widespread appeal of the representational stance, detailed working out of the position within perceptual theory is still needed.

引用

页码：704 / 709

页数：6

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