FORWARD CONTRACTS AND FIRM VALUE - INVESTMENT INCENTIVE AND CONTRACTING EFFECTS

被引:187
作者
BESSEMBINDER, H
机构
[1] College of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2331409
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Corporate risk hedging with forward contracts increases value by reducing incentives to underinvest. This occurs because the hedge decreases the sensitivity of senior claim value to incremental investment, allowing equity holders to capture a larger portion of the incremental benefit from new investment. Hedging also allows the firm to credibly commit to meet obligations in states where it otherwise could not, which improves contract terms the firm can negotiate with customers, creditors, and managers. These benefits cannot be duplicated by individual hedging, and each result holds independent of agents' risk preferences. © 1991, School of Business Administration, University of Washington. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:519 / 532
页数:14
相关论文
共 16 条
[1]   ON THE OPTIMAL HEDGE OF A NONTRADED CASH POSITION [J].
ADLER, M ;
DETEMPLE, JB .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1988, 43 (01) :143-153
[2]   CROSS HEDGING [J].
ANDERSON, RW ;
DANTHINE, JP .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (06) :1182-1196
[3]  
BARON DP, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P253
[4]  
BOOTH J, 1990, MONITORING INSIDE DE
[5]   REPUTATION ACQUISITION IN DEBT MARKETS [J].
DIAMOND, DW .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1989, 97 (04) :828-862
[6]  
GUREL E, 1984, J FINANC, V34, P1199
[7]   INTERTEMPORAL COMMODITY FUTURES HEDGING AND THE PRODUCTION DECISION [J].
HO, TSY .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1984, 39 (02) :351-376
[8]  
HOLTHAUSEN DM, 1979, AM ECON REV, V69, P989
[9]   FORWARD MARKETS, STOCK MARKETS, AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM [J].
MACMINN, RD .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1987, 42 (05) :1167-1185
[10]  
MAYERS D, 1987, J RISK INSURANCE MAR, P45