PREDICTING ADVERTISING PULSING POLICIES IN AN OLIGOPOLY - A MODEL AND EMPIRICAL-TEST

被引：57

作者：

VILLASBOAS, JM

机构：

来源：

MARKETING SCIENCE | 1993年 / 12卷 / 01期

关键词：

COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES; COMPETITIVE ADVERTISING; PULSING;

D O I：

10.1287/mksc.12.1.88

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Given that firms pulse in advertising, should firms pulse in or out of phase? It is shown that out of phase maximizes the oligopoly profits and is also the Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game. The basic intuition for this result comes from the following fact: it is more profitable to increase consideration when the competitor's consideration is lower. Evidence from several product categories seems to support this theoretical result.

引用

页码：88 / 102

页数：15

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