THE EFFECTS OF PAY SCHEMES AND RATCHETS ON BUDGETARY SLACK AND PERFORMANCE - A MULTIPERIOD EXPERIMENT

被引：42

作者：

CHOW, CW ^{[1
]}

COOPER, JC ^{[1
]}

HADDAD, K ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV KENTUCKY,LEXINGTON,KY 40506

来源：

ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY | 1991年 / 16卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0361-3682(91)90032-A

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

A widely recognized problem in planning and control is motivating subordinates both to maximize performance and to truthfully reveal their performance expectations. This study uses a multiperiod experiment to test the purported effects of a truth-inducing (TI) pay scheme suggested by the analytical literature, and a ratchet in standard-setting, on these subordinate choices. When the superior lacked information on subordinates' performance capability, subjects who self-set standards under the TI scheme inserted significantly less slack than those who did so under an alternate pay scheme which lacked the truth-introducing property. Howevers, as information became available on subordinates' past performance, imposing a ratchet was just as effective in reducing budgetary slack. The results also supported the prediction that a ratchet reduced the extent of standard overfulfilment. © 1991.

引用

页码：47 / 60

页数：14