A PROCEDURAL MODEL OF VOTING

被引：6

作者：

HANSSON, SO

机构：

[1] Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 75236

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 1992年 / 32卷 / 03期

关键词：

PROCEDURAL PREFERENCES; METAPREFERENCES; PREFERENCES; CHOICE; CONSENSUS; VOTING; STRATEGIC VOTING;

D O I：

10.1007/BF00134152

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The formal framework of social choice theory is generalized through the introduction of separate representations of preferences and choices. This makes it possible to treat voting as a procedure in which decisions are actually made by interacting participants, rather than as a mere mechanism for aggregation. The extended framework also allows for non-consequentialist preferences that take procedural factors into account. Concepts such as decisiveness, anonymity, neutrality, and stability are redefined for use in the new context. The formal results obtained confirm the universality of strategic voting.

引用

页码：269 / 301

页数：33

共 21 条

[1] BEYOND VOTERS PARADOX [J].