THE USE OF ACCOUNTING AND SECURITY PRICE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION CONTRACTS - A DISCUSSION

被引：29

作者：

LAMBERT, RA

机构：

[1] Stanford University, Stanford

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1993年 / 16卷 / 1-3期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4101(93)90006-2

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

It is commonly observed that the compensation paid to senior level executives depends on both accounting and security price measures of performance. The articles by Kim and Suh, Bushman and Indjejikian, and Sloan, which I have been invited to discuss, examine the issue of how much weight to place on these two measures in the contract. The first two papers analyze the role that earnings can play in removing the 'noise' in stock price in a rational expectations pricing model. The Sloan paper analytically and empirically examines the role that earnings can play in removing macroeconomic factors from stock price.

引用

页码：101 / 123

页数：23

共 14 条

[1]

ANTLE R, 1986, J ACCOUNTING RES SPR, P113

[2]

BANKER R, 1989, J ACCOUNTING RES SPR, P21

[3] ACCOUNTING INCOME, STOCK-PRICE, AND MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION [J].

BUSHMAN, RM ;

INDJEJIKIAN, RJ .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1993, 16 (1-3) :3-23

[4] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J].

HOLMSTROM, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02) :324-340

[5] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J].

HOLMSTROM, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01) :74-91

[6]

JANAKIRAMAN S, 1992, J ACCOUNTING RES SPR, P53

[7] INCENTIVE EFFICIENCY OF COMPENSATION BASED ON ACCOUNTING AND MARKET PERFORMANCE [J].

KIM, O ;

SUH, Y .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1993, 16 (1-3) :25-53

[8]

Lambert R., 1987, J ACCOUNTING RES S, P85

[9]

NATARAJAN R, 1992, USE DISCRETIONARY AC

[10]

PAUL JM, 1991, MANAGERIAL MYOPIA OB

← 1 2 →