MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE-INVESTMENT AND FINANCING DECISIONS

被引：304

作者：

AGRAWAL, A ^{[1
]}

MANDELKER, GN ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PITTSBURGH,GRAD SCH BUSINESS,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 1987年 / 42卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03914.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：823 / 837

页数：15

共 16 条

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