A PARTIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF A HISTORY-DEPENDENT, SUBGAME-PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM - THE CASE OF AN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE DUOPOLY

被引：1

作者：

CAIRNS, RD

MOREAUX, M

机构：

[1] UNIV MONTREAL,CRDE,MONTREAL H3C 3J7,QUEBEC,CANADA

[2] UNIV TOULOUSE 3,GREMAQ,F-31062 TOULOUSE,FRANCE

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1990年 / 32卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(90)90053-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If there is a quasi-fixed cost of production from an exhaustible resource, there may exist history-dependent, subgame-perfect equilibria other than those where duopolists produce an equal amount in each period. The model exemplifies the relevance of Chakrabarti's theorem on existence of such equilibria. © 1990.

引用

页码：81 / 84

页数：4