WEAK AND STRONG MERGING OF OPINIONS

被引：64

作者：

KALAI, E

LEHRER, E

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,DEPT MATH,EVANSTON,IL 60208

[2] TEL AVIV UNIV,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAEL

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 23卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

MERGING; BAYESIAN LEARNING;

D O I：

10.1016/0304-4068(94)90037-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study merging, in a few senses, of two measures when increasing sequence of information is observed. Motivating this extension of Blackwell and Dubins' (1962) work, are studies of convergence to equilibrium in infinite games and in dynamic economies.

引用

页码：73 / 86

页数：14

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