COLLUSIVE PRICING IN MARKETS FOR VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS

被引:55
作者
HACKNER, J
机构
[1] The Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research, S-114 85 Stockholm
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0167-7187(94)90011-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines the relationship between product differentiation and the sustainability of collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products. The main finding is that collusion is more easily sustained, the more similar the products are. Exactly the opposite result may be obtained in models of horizontal differentiation. Consequently, when products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically, theory provides no clearcut prediction.
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页码:155 / 177
页数:23
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