A MODEL FORMALIZING THE THEORY OF PROPERTY-RIGHTS

被引:10
作者
YANG, XK
WILLS, I
机构
[1] Monash University, Clayton
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0147-5967(90)90068-K
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper constructs an equilibrium model that formalizes a tradeoff between the gains from trade based on increasing returns to specialization and the costs involved in specifying and enforcing property rights. The model is used to investigate the effect of differing economies of specialization, and differing efficiency in specifying and enforcing property rights, on the level of division of labor, productivity, the number of markets in existence, and the efficient degree of vagueness of property rights. © 1990.
引用
收藏
页码:177 / 198
页数:22
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