NONCOOPERATIVE MATCHING GAMES

被引：14

作者：

KAMECKE, U

机构：

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1989年 / 18卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01358802

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：423 / 431

页数：9

共 15 条

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[4]

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[5]

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[9] SYMMETRICALLY PAIRWISE-BARGAINED ALLOCATIONS IN AN ASSIGNMENT MARKET [J].

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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1984, 34 (02) :262-281

[10] THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM [J].

ROTH, AE .

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