THE ROLE OF ALTRUISM IN ECONOMIC INTERACTION

被引:10
作者
HALTIWANGER, J [1 ]
WALDMAN, M [1 ]
机构
[1] CORNELL UNIV,ITHACA,NY 14853
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0167-2681(93)90036-O
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper considers environments in which the population consists of a mix of altruists and egoists, and asks under what situations do altruists have a disproportionately large effect on equilibrium, and under what situations is it the egoists. We begin by presenting a general framework for answering this question. We then apply the framework to the analysis of three economic environments: (1) the classic problem referred to as the Prisoner's Dilemma; (2) a world where agents decide whether or not to pollute the environment; and (3) a world where agents decide whether or not to donate blood.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 15
页数:15
相关论文
共 31 条
[1]   GIVING WITH IMPURE ALTRUISM - APPLICATIONS TO CHARITY AND RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE [J].
ANDREONI, J .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1989, 97 (06) :1447-1458
[2]  
ARROW KJ, 1972, PHILOS PUBLIC AFF, V1, P343
[3]  
Baumol W., 1975, THEORY ENV POLICY
[4]  
BECKER GS, 1976, J ECON LIT, V14, P817
[5]   THEORY OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS [J].
BECKER, GS .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1974, 82 (06) :1063-1093
[6]  
BERNHEIM BD, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P789
[7]   THE ROTTEN-KID THEOREM MEETS THE SAMARITANS DILEMMA [J].
BRUCE, N ;
WALDMAN, M .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 105 (01) :155-165
[8]  
BRUCE N, 1991, AM ECON REV, V81, P1345
[9]  
Collard D., 1978, ALTRUISM EC
[10]  
FARRELL J, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P940