INFORMATION AND RATIONALITY ASYMMETRIES IN A SIMPLE HIGH-LOW SEARCH WAGE MODEL

被引：2

作者：

REYNIERS, DJ

机构：

[1] London Business School, London

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1992年 / 38卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(92)90037-Y

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A simple model of wage bargaining is developed. The firm knows the worker's productivity but the worker has only probabilistic information about his value to the firm. The worker acquires information by making wage demands and observing the resulting hiring/firing decisions of the firm. The firm acts strategically and distorts the worker's learning process.

引用

页码：479 / 486

页数：8