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- [5] [No title captured]
IMPLEMENTATION VIA NASH EQUILIBRIA
被引：55
作者：
DANILOV, V
机构：
关键词：
IMPLEMENTATION;
MECHANISM;
MONOTONICITY;
NASH EQUILIBRIUM;
SOCIAL CHOICE CORRESPONDENCE;
D O I：
10.2307/2951675
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper is concerned with a problem of implementation of a given social choice correspondence (SCC). We introduce an essential monotonicity condition and show that any implementable SCC satisfies this condition. Conversely, in a case of three or more participants any essentially monotone SCC is implementable. In a case of two participants the essential monotonicity condition must be completed by a requirement that the SCC is close to an individually rational correspondence.
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页码：43 / 56
页数：14
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