AN OPTIMAL-INCENTIVE CONTRACT FOR MANAGERS WITH EXPONENTIAL UTILITY

被引：4

作者：

HAUGEN, RA ^{[1
]}

TAYLOR, WM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV WISCONSIN,GRAD SCH BUSINESS,MADISON,WI 53706

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1002/mde.4090080202

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：87 / 91

页数：5

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