MATRIX VALUES AND COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN PRISONERS DILEMMA GAME

THE EFFECT OF MATRIX VALUES UPON COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA (PD) GAME WAS INVESTIGATED IN A 3 * 3 DESIGN WITH 90 UNDERGRADUATES. 2 INDEPENDENT FACTORS RELATING TO THE MATRIX VALUES WERE USED IN THE DESIGN. THE 1ST FACTOR WAS A RATIO OF DIFFERENCES AMONG THE 4 MATRIX VALUES IN A SYMMETRICAL PD: REWARD-PUNISHMENT/TEMPTATION-SUCKER. THE OTHER FACTOR WAS THE ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDE OF THE MATRIX VALUES. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RATIO AND COOPERATION (CP) WAS FOUND TO BE LOGARITHMIC AND THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT OVERALL EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDE OF VALUES. HOWEVER, A DIFFERENCE WAS FOUND BETWEEN NEGATIVE AND NONNEGATIVE PAYOFF VALUES. THESE PREDICTED RESULTS WERE COMPARED WITH CONFLICTING PREVIOUS FINDINGS AND THE DISCREPANCIES WERE EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF THE PERCEIVED UTILITY OF THE PAYOFFS. ALSO, CP WAS FOUND TO DECREASE IN A LINEAR FASHION AS A FUNCTION OF TIME (150 TRIALS), WITH NO SIGNIFICANT INDEX OR TRANSFORMATION INTERACTIONS WITH TIME. (20 REF.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved). © 1968 American Psychological Association.