THE UNPROFITABILITY OF MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN 2 PERSON GAMES - A 2ND FOLK-THEOREM

被引：18

作者：

HOLLER, MJ

机构：

[1] Aarhus University

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1990年 / 32卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(90)90022-S

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, it is demonstrated that the payoffs of mixed-strategy equilibria are equal to the maximin values for all (2X2) matrix games if maximim implies completely mixed strategies. This characterizes a subclass of unprofitable games. Maximin, instead of Nash equilibrium, has been suggested as an appropriate solution concept for these games. © 1990.

引用

页码：319 / 323

页数：5

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