IMPLICIT COALITIONS IN A GENERALIZED PRISONERS-DILEMMA

被引:22
作者
FADER, PS [1 ]
HAUSER, JR [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT,ALFRED P SLOAN SCH MANAGEMENT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
关键词
D O I
10.1177/0022002788032003008
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:553 / 582
页数:30
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