INSTITUTIONS, EFFICIENCY AND THE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR OF SPONSORS AND BUREAUS

被引:18
作者
CHAN, KS
MESTELMAN, S
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(88)90006-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:91 / 102
页数:12
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