BARRIERS WITHIN FIRMS TO ENERGY-EFFICIENT INVESTMENTS

被引:190
作者
DECANIO, SJ [1 ]
机构
[1] FIELDING INST,SANTA BARBARA,CA
关键词
ENERGY EFFICIENCY; PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM; BOUNDED RATIONALITY;
D O I
10.1016/0301-4215(93)90178-I
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Many investments in energy efficiency fail to be made despite their apparent profitability. Internal hurdle rates are often set at levels higher than the cost of capital to the firm. Reasons for these practices include bounded rationality, principal-agent problems, and moral hazard. The policy implication is that government can simultaneously improve overall energy efficiency and increase private sector productivity by providing informational and organizational services that go beyond the traditional regulatory framework.
引用
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页码:906 / 914
页数:9
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