RISK-SHIFTING INCENTIVES AND SIGNALING THROUGH CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE

被引:26
作者
JOHN, K [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CHICAGO,CHICAGO,IL 60637
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2328375
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:623 / 641
页数:19
相关论文
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