TESTS OF MEDIAN VOTER AND POLITICAL SUPPORT MAXIMIZATION MODELS - THE CASE OF FEDERAL STATE WELFARE PROGRAMS

Empirical tests of basic formulations of a median voter approach versus a political support maximization approach to state government decision making are conducted in this article. Refutable empirical implications are rigorously developed from the theoretical models and are tested with data on welfare programs for which there is both a state and a federal component. The programs analyzed include both an in-kind program (Medicaid) and a cash transfer program (AFDC). Efficient estimates are produced by using a systemwide approach in the estimation. The results favor the use of political support models that include altruistic motives on the part of taxpayers. Empirical estimates indicate that a state's welfare generosity per poor person falls with the total number of poor, rises with the total number of nonpoor, and rises with the strength of a relevant producer group.