A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL OF CRIME COMMISSION AND PREVENTION

[1] [Anonymous], CRIME POLICE CRIMINA

[2] THE MARKET FOR STREET CRIME - AN ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER INTERACTION [J]. JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, 1981, 10 (03) : 390 - 405

[3] CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (02) : 169 - 217

[4] BLOCK MK, 1975, AM ECON REV, V65, P314

[5] PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES - THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1973, 81 (03) : 521 - 565

[6] EHRLICH I, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P307

[7] FURLONG W, 1984, THESIS QUEENS U KING

[8] Hardy G. H., 1934, INEQUALITIES

[9] POLINSKY AM, 1979, AM ECON REV, V69, P880

[10] THE OPTIMAL USE OF FINES AND IMPRISONMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1984, 24 (01) : 89 - 99

[1] [Anonymous], CRIME POLICE CRIMINA

[2] THE MARKET FOR STREET CRIME - AN ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER INTERACTION [J]. JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, 1981, 10 (03) : 390 - 405

[3] CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (02) : 169 - 217

[4] BLOCK MK, 1975, AM ECON REV, V65, P314

[5] PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES - THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1973, 81 (03) : 521 - 565

[6] EHRLICH I, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P307

[7] FURLONG W, 1984, THESIS QUEENS U KING

[8] Hardy G. H., 1934, INEQUALITIES

[9] POLINSKY AM, 1979, AM ECON REV, V69, P880

[10] THE OPTIMAL USE OF FINES AND IMPRISONMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1984, 24 (01) : 89 - 99